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The recent “First Step Act” is the most significant federal criminal justice reform in 
decades.  Still, it is a modest first step.  The law eases the sentences of some inmates 
in federal prison, but it will not impact the problem of mass incarceration significantly 
because it does not address the many inmates incarcerated in state and local 
facilities.  Nor does the law address problems within policing.  
In fact, the United States is moving away from policing reform.  Despite the growing 
tension between many police departments and their communities, the Department of 
Justice has reduced oversight of cities that have demonstrated policing abuses and 
civil rights violations.  This recent trend is occurring at a time when it is difficult to open a 
newspaper without seeing a tragic headline about police violence. 
Prominent cases have involved officers shooting persons in the back who were fleeing 
and not an imminent threat, and these cases are often along racial lines (see, for 
example the cases of Walter Scott and Laquan McDonald).   The headlines are not 
only about shootings, but also about police officers who used unnecessary force—such 
as unauthorized chokeholds—that resulted in death (such as with Eric Garner).  
Practical problems of policing raise a variety of philosophical problems, including the 
problem noted by rapper Ice Cube in a well-known N.W.A. song: “F*** the police coming 
straight from the underground, a young n**** got it bad cause I’m brown, and not the 
other color so police think, they have the authority to kill a minority.”  In so many words, 
Ice Cube raised a question about the police’s authority: On what basis do the police 
have the right to use deadly force, engage in deception, and exercise discretion 
generally?  
One way to answer the question is to say that police have authority by virtue of the 
state’s legitimacy—the moral right to command and be obeyed.  Community-oriented 
policing is often described as a way to achieve legitimacy because the strategy seeks to 
build community trust and promote procedural justice.  But as illustrated by the trends 
noted above, some are seeking policies that are “tough on crime” at the expense of 
procedural justice and community-oriented policing.  It is for this reason that we see a 
return to policies that emphasize security (“law and order”). Prominent examples include 
increased police militarization, re-escalation of the “war on drugs,” and zero tolerance 
immigration policies that nullify prosecutorial discretion.  
Balancing security, legitimacy, and related rule of law principles is nothing new in liberal 
societies.  It is illustrative to consider how the idea of public reason—the idea that 
government principles should be justifiable to all those to whom the principles are meant 
to apply—might help balance our policing goals and justify community-oriented 
policing.  Public reason serves as a sort of moral foundation that justifies the strategy 
because community-oriented policing promotes legitimacy by bolstering autonomy, 
justice, and respect regarding the differences within a community. 
Draconian policies may reduce crime in the short term, but they promote a police 
“warrior” role and an “us versus them” mindset in the long run. Conversely, public 
reason is a doctrine about civic partnership and reciprocity: The enforcement of law is 
legitimate when it is based upon political arrangements that reasonable citizens could 
endorse. This includes arrangements that bolster public values—such as fairness, 
equality, and the rule of law—drawn from common sense principles of social 
cooperation. It follows that political power and coercive force based upon arbitrary 
authority is illegitimate.  
Legitimacy often begins with consent.  If one agrees to some form of political authority, 
then we usually deem that authority to be legitimate.  But we know that receiving explicit 
consent from everyone governed in the community is a practical impossibility.  Public 
reason might thus be viewed as a middle ground for justifying our moral and political 
principles to everyone to whom the principles are meant to apply.  And that is one way 
to achieve some form of legitimacy with respect to those principles—especially in the 
realm of policing.  
A first step toward addressing this problem through public reason is to acknowledge that 
policing is more than law enforcement. In addition to law enforcement officers, the 
police are emergency operators (responding to accidents on the highway) and social 
operators (responding to domestic disputes or other non-law-enforcement community 
problems).  More broadly, the police are responsible for maintaining peace in a way that 
is consistent with the limits of the state’s legitimate power—a responsibility that requires 
building community trust about that power.  This is the basic idea behind procedural 
justice and community-oriented policing. 
A focus upon ethics in law enforcement training is central to community-oriented 
policing.  This includes instruction that emphasizes each community member’s dignity, 
including those who have broken the law. It likewise addresses how ethnicity, gender, 
age, and socioeconomic factors might impact an officer’s interaction with the 
community, as well as how officers should deal with mental health-related issues.  As 
the next steps in criminal justice reform are considered, one might hope that they 
promote the basic tenets of public reason through renewed emphasis on federal 
oversight of troubled departments in need of procedural justice and community-oriented 
policing strategies.  Law enforcement is a big part of policing, but it’s not the only part. 
 
